Dietrich, Simone. 2021. States, Markets, and Foreign Aid. Cambridge University Press (in production, release August 2021) 

Why do some donor governments pursue international development through recipient governments, while others bypass such local authorities? Weaving together scholarship in political economy, public administration, and historical institutionalism, States, Markets, and Foreign Aid makes the case that the bureaucratic institutions of donor countries shapes donor-recipient interactions differently despite similar international and recipient country conditions. Donor nations employ institutional constraints that authorize, enable, and justify particular aid delivery tactics while precluding others. Offering quantitative and qualitative analyses of donor decision-making, the book illuminates how donor countries whose institutions are organized around neoliberal principles bypass recipient governments, while donors with more traditional public sector-oriented institutions cooperate and engage recipient authorities on aid delivery.  

The book establishes connections between ideological orientations and patterns of donor behavior. It demonstrates how internal beliefs and practices about states and markets inform how donors see and set their objectives for foreign aid and international development itself. These insights carry implications for debates about the effectiveness of international development efforts, donor coordination, the diffusion of international development norms in world politics, as well as the role of bureaucratic organization in foreign policy and multilateralism, more broadly.

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